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Abstract
The health sector often appears prominent in surveys of perceived corruption, because citizens experience the 
symptoms of systemic corruption most distressingly during their interaction with frontline health workers. 
However, the underlying drivers of systemic corruption in society may be located in other social systems with 
the health system demonstrating the symptoms but not the path how to exit the situation. We need to understand 
the mechanisms of systemic corruption including the role of corrupt national and international leaders, the role 
of transnational corporations and international financial flows. We require a corruption definition which goes 
beyond an exclusive focus on the corrupt individual and considers social systems and organisations facilitating 
corruption. Finally there is an urgent need to address the serious lack of funding and research in the area of 
systemic corruption, because it undermines the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in 
many low income countries with the most deprived populations.
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Introduction
Recently your journal has published an editorial “We 
Need to Talk About Corruption in Health Systems”1 and a 
commentary “Opening the Policy Window to Mobilize Action 
Against Corruption in the Health Sector.”2 Both articles have 
raised important issues of health sector and health systems 
corruption. The health sector is vulnerable to corruption for 
several reasons which have been discussed elsewhere.3 In a 
society with widespread or systemic corruption citizens are 
likely to experience the symptoms of corruption in their 
interaction with frontline health workers. However, similar 
to the treatment of fever in Malaria which does not cure the 
disease, a focus on the corrupt symptoms in the health sector 
does not address the underlying societal causes of widespread 
corruption. These issues are not or only briefly mentioned 
in the editorial and the commentary. The challenges include 
the inadequate definition of corruption which needs to 
consider organisational and systemic corruption outside 
individual control and beyond the health sector, corruption 
in the political and administrative leadership of a country, the 
corrupt behaviour of international corporations and political 
leaders as successful role models, global financial corruption 
facilitating national corruption and the lack of research about 
the underlying drivers of systemic corruption. 
Corruption Definition
The definition of corruption determines what we perceive 
as the problem and how it will be tackled. The change of 
definition from the misuse of public office for private gain4 
to “abuse of entrusted power for private gain” (pxvii),5 has 
addressed the misleading concept that privatisation may get 
rid of corruption. However, both definitions do not clearly take 
account of organised and systemic corruption which is part 
of the original meaning of the term corruption as the decay 
and putrefaction of a system. In Table 1 the author compares 
individual, organisational, and systemic corruption. While 
there are no universally agreed definitions of organisational 
and systemic corruption,6 certain characteristics appear to be 
common.
The main role of the state to protect the public good can be 
undermined when powerful societal actors capture the state or 
some of its organs and weaken the universal functions of the 
state for private organisational gain.7 Typical examples from 
the health sector are the deliberate sale and dissemination of 
counterfeit and sub-standard medicines and diagnostics or the 
purchase of pharmaceutical goods at an excessive price (Table 
1). Organisational tax evasion and avoidance are practices 
that undermine public goods such as universal health services 
and ethical standards in society. 
However, there is an important difference between tax 
evasion and avoidance. The former is illegal, while the latter is 
legal and some citizens, especially with a neoliberal ideology, 
for whom private gains take precedence over the common 
good, may describe it as an ethical practice. Illegal corruption 
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is easy to define as a person with entrusted power who uses 
the position for private gains. The corrupt practices vary and 
include the demand of gifts or cash for public services. These 
are clearly defined as illegal in most state jurisdictions. It is 
more difficult to agree whether a legal practice is unethical 
and corrupt. Should tax avoidance through transfer pricing of 
a company and tolerated by the tax authority be defined as a 
legal but unethical and corrupt practice, because it undermines 
the capacity of the state to provide universal public services? 
The answer is yes, in case we apply Lessig’s definition of 
institutional corruption8: “Institutional corruption is manifest 
when there is a systemic and strategic influence which is legal, 
or even currently ethical, that undermines the institution’s 
effectiveness by diverting it from its purpose or weakening 
its ability to achieve its purpose, including, to the extent 
relevant to its purpose, weakening either the public’s trust in 
that institution or the institution’s inherent trustworthiness.” 
The worst case is systemic corruption when several societal 
institutions such as police, judiciary, tax authority and others 
are undermined by corrupt practices.
Systemic Corruption and the Health System
With systemic corruption corrupt behaviour becomes an 
integral part of the economic, social and political systems 
in a society.9,10 Some have described it as endemic or 
institutionalised corruption. Citizens have to learn how to 
deal with corrupt officials. It becomes normal practice in 
transactions between public servants and individuals or 
businesses. There are strong incentives for everybody to 
comply with this illegitimate system. 
Most sectors are affected and interventions need to target at 
least several key or all sectors. Interventions with an exclusive 
focus on the health sector are unlikely to succeed, because the 
state and its different organs such as legislature, executive, 
judiciary, police and anti-corruption agencies are seriously 
affected by corruption.7 
There are no specific and agreed indicators of systemic 
corruption. However, high levels of public sector corruption 
as determined by the corruption perception index of 
Transparency International11 are likely to point to systemic 
corruption. The combined estimated performance of 
33 health-related Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 
indicators based on the Global Burden of Disease study12 
provides some indication of societal achievement related to 
health. The author selected the bottom 20 out of 188 countries 
in terms of health achievement and compared their ranking 
in the corruption perception index of the same year (Table 1). 
Many of the worst performers in health are associated with a 
high level of perceived corruption.
There are windows of opportunity to redress societies, 
reduce and overcome systemic corruption. This seems to 
have happened to some extent in Rwanda after the genocide 
in 199413 and in Singapore in 1960 after the enactment of the 
Prevention of Corruption Act.14 In these two countries it was 
mainly due to national drivers of change. 
Unfortunately most of the time the international community 
is willing to overlook even blatant cases of political and 
systemic corruption. This was demonstrated by the recent 
presidential election in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo in 2018/2019.15 One consequence is the deep mistrust 
of citizens in the government which has a serious impact on 
the control of the actual Ebola epidemic in the country.16 It 
Table 1. Comparison of Individual, Organisational and, Systemic Corruption
Level Individual Organisational Systemic
Definition
Abuse of entrusted power for private 
gain5
Abuse of entrusted power at organisational level 
for private gain
Deliberate betrayal of public trust and the 
undermining of the public good for private 
gain7
Main actors Individuals
Private companies and government of state 
organisation
Individuals, companies, governments
Description
Common corrupt practices which 
are the focus of corruption research 
and intervention. These are also part 
of organisational and institutional 
corruption.
Unethical or illegal and opaque contract 
arrangements which are not Following agreed good 
governance procedures between private companies 
and government. Corruption has become a way to 
finance politicians and political parties.
Several or most societal sectors function on 
the basis of corrupt practices. Corruption 
has been normalized and becomes the 
‘way of life.’
Main 
mechanism
Corrupt actors use deficiencies and 
inconsistencies in management 
procedures and the rule of law.
Corrupt actors use the contacts to high-ranking 
government officials and their interest in corrupt 
deals.
Rule of power has replaced the rule of 
law.
Beneficiaries
Individuals directly involved 
in corrupt practices and their 
associates.
Individuals involved in contract procedures but 
also government and company leadership, senior 
management and potentially owners of company 
without direct involvement in corrupt action. 
Disguise of plausible denial because of lack of 
transparency and written evidence.
Individuals and organisations at the top 
of the power hierarchy in society benefit 
to a large extent while many citizens are 
involved to a certain extent in order to 
survive in society. Poor citizens at the 
bottom of the hierarchy suffer most from 
systemic corruption.
Example 
health sector
Frontline health professionals 
demand bribes from patients in 
exchange for treatment.
Order of pharmaceutical goods includes a kickback 
for senior government officials. Kickbacks are paid 
into foreign bank accounts where financial flows 
and owners are protected from public scrutiny.
Citizens or health professionals who 
complain about corrupt practices to an 
ombudsperson or anti-corruption agency 
are threatened and harmed.
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is also reflected in the poor position of the country in terms 
of perceived corruption and health achievement (Table 2). 
Another typical example is Angola with enormous petroleum 
wealth but poor health indicators and high levels of perceived 
corruption. Instead the country has produced Africa’s richest 
woman who also happens to be the daughter of the country’s 
former long-standing president.17
Societies with embedded systemic corruption are at high 
risk to slide into a vicious cycle of sustainable corruption. 
Leaders and corporate organisations at the top of the national 
and international power hierarchy profit from the situation 
and have little interest in radical change. Corrupt politicians 
and corporations attract others with similar interests and deter 
any promoters of good governance. An opaque international 
financial system which is not accountable to the public good 
of societies facilitates corrupt practices. An international 
governance system where unconditional national sovereignty 
is a supreme principle prevents collective international action. 
The next sections describe some of the factors facilitating 
systemic corruption.
Corrupt Decision-Makers in Leading Government Positions
This issue is closely linked to systemic corruption. Many 
anti-corruption interventions fail, because international 
organisations wrongly assume that the government has 
the political will to fight against corruption. Persson et al18 
“argue that part of an explanation to why anticorruption 
reforms in countries plagued by widespread corruption fail 
is that they are based on a theoretical mischaracterization 
of the problem of systemic corruption.…the analysis reveals 
that while contemporary anticorruption reforms are based 
on a conceptualization of corruption as a principal–agent 
problem, in thoroughly corrupt settings, corruption rather 
resembles a collective action problem.” The anticorruption 
reform wrongly assumes principled principals. In reality we 
are confronted with a breakdown of trust and reputation in 
society which leads to a failure to sanction corrupt behaviours 
and change societal rules. Ostrom19 defines it as a collective 
action problem of the second order.
Behaviour of International Leaders and Transnational 
Corporations
Your commentary mentions the seminal 1996 speech 
of World Bank President James Wolfensohn against the 
cancer of corruption. A big challenge is the consistency and 
credibility of the international discourse. His successor in the 
World Bank was Mr. Paul Wolfowitz. He had to resign from 
his position because of clear evidence of rule violations and 
attempts to weaken whistle-blower protection within the 
organisation.20
President Trump practices nepotism21,22 and appoints family 
members into White House positions. Private gains from 
these appointments may not be illegal but they are clearly 
unethical.23 Whether you classify it as corrupt behaviour 
may depend on the definition of corruption. Mr. Trump was 
the first major-party presidential nominee in more than 40 
years who did not to release his tax returns, and he is the 
first president since the early 1970s to decline to release tax 
Table 2. Comparison of Positions Based on Health-Related SDG Indicators and 
Corruption Perception Index 
Country
Position out of 188 
Countries (**)12
Position out of 168 
Countries (*), (**)11
Lesotho 169 061
Angola 170 163
Cameroon 171 130
Burkina Faso 172 076
Uganda 173 139
Ethiopia 174 102
Guinea 175 139
Guinea-Bissau 176 158
Mozambique 177 111
Madagascar 178 123
Sierra Leone 179 119
Afghanistan 180 166
Mali 181 095
Burundi 182 150
Democratic Republic of the 
Congo
183 147
Chad 184 147
Niger 185 098
South Sudan 186 163
Somalia 187 167
Central African Republic 188 145
Abbreviation: SDG, Sustainable Development Goal.
Note: (*) Several countries can hold the same position in the index. The next 
lower country will receive the rank which equals the number of countries 
in the position above this country plus 1. (**) Lower rank indicates worse 
situation.
information, either through a summary or a full or partial 
return. This political and ethical standard setting of the 
President of the United States may be used to justify similar 
leadership behaviour in other countries. 
Unfortunately the behaviour of transnational corporations 
often puts profits before the health of the public. The excess 
Nitrogen oxides emissions of Volkswagen cause premature 
deaths and enormous costs for the public health systems in 
European24 and other countries The same probably applies 
to other car manufacturers using similar manipulative 
‘defeat devices’ to lower emissions during vehicle testing for 
regulatory purposes. 
The classification of Glyphosate as probably carcinogenic to 
humans by a group of experts at the International Agency for 
Research on Cancer, a body of the World Health Organisation,25 
has drawn attention to the fact how transnational corporations 
such as Monsanto attempt to influence and manipulate science 
in order to give priority to profit over public health. The key 
issue here is not the carcinogenicity of the substance, but how 
the power of a company is used to confuse the public and 
discredit scientists.26 Whether you classify these leadership 
and corporate behaviours as corrupt depends again on the 
definition of corruption which you want to apply.7,9,10,21,27 
These cases affect public health and international ethics and 
leave health professionals and the public with the perception 
that the discourse of global corruption prevention and control 
may have a focus on the small rather than the big fish. 
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Financing of Health Systems
The opaque international financial system which is not 
accountable to the public good at the national or international 
level facilitates corrupt practices. Illegal tax evasion and legal 
but unethical tax avoidance are major obstacles to adequate 
health system financing. The OXFAM report “Prescription for 
Poverty”28 states “four pharmaceutical corporations—Abbott, 
Johnson & Johnson, Merck, and Pfizer—systematically stash 
their profits in overseas tax havens. They appear to deprive 
developing countries of more than $100 million every year—
money that is urgently needed to meet the health needs of 
people in these countries—while vastly overcharging for their 
products. And these corporations deploy massive influencing 
operations to rig the rules in their favour and give their 
damaging behaviour a veneer of legitimacy. Tax dodging, high 
prices and influence peddling by drug companies exacerbate 
the yawning gap between rich and poor, between men and 
women, and between advanced economies and developing 
ones.”
The Corporate Tax Haven Index29 explains how certain 
jurisdictions are used by transnational corporations to 
escape paying tax and how this erodes the tax revenues of 
countries around the world. Among the top ten tax havens 
are four British overseas territories or crown dependencies, 
two member states of the European Union and one other 
European state.
If we want to understand the mechanisms and chains 
of corruption, it is not sufficient to focus on the behaviour 
of frontline health workers. When working in the Central 
African Republic (bottom position in Table 2) from 1992 
to 1998 government health workers received less than 
50% of their very low salaries and sometimes only 1 out of 
12 monthly salaries were paid. Widespread absenteeism, 
bribery and other corrupt practices attributed to frontline 
health providers are clearly unacceptable, but they need to 
be understood in the context of a dysfunctional state and 
governments, an underfinanced healthcare system, the 
plunder of rich natural resources and international financial 
flows towards tax havens.
Funding and Ethics of Corruption Research 
The paucity of good evidence about corruption interventions, 
especially from low- and middle-income countries should 
come as no surprise.30 The author searched the PubMed 
database with no time restriction for articles on corruption 
and health systems. In contrast to the search ‘Malaria and 
health systems’ which resulted in 2045 results (1968-2019) the 
‘corruption and health systems’ search resulted in 98 results 
(1985-2019). Only 12 documents covered the complex issue 
linking political, grand and petty corruption. Why is this 
important? 
The author worked from 1985 to 1990 as clinician and 
public health professional in Zimbabwe and observed the 
‘Trickle down’ effect of corruption.31 My colleagues described 
it as ‘The fish rots from the head down.’ Significant petty 
corruption is only feasible in the presence of widespread 
grand and political corruption. In order to address the issues 
of systemic or institutionalized corruption and its important 
effect on the health system, more research on the relationship 
and interdependence between political, grand and petty 
corruption including effective interventions is required. The 
author is waiting to see funding provided for such research 
and the development of an international ethical approval 
mechanism to conduct such research on a scale appropriate 
to the size of the problem. 
Unfortunately powerful actors with strong interests in the 
‘status quo’ stand in the way of global research on systemic 
corruption. An opaque international financial sector which is 
not accountable to the global common good favours instead 
the global elite which is not interested in change. Therefore 
policy-makers and academics can only burn their careers, 
if they focus on such a ‘sensitive’ topic. Another important 
challenge is the need for an interdisciplinary, intersectoral 
and international study approach targeting national and 
international elites. 
Ethical issues
Not applicable.
Competing interests
Author declares that he has no competing interests. 
Author’s contribution
RH is the single author of the paper. 
References
1. Hutchinson E, Balabanova D, McKee M. We Need to Talk 
About Corruption in Health Systems. Int J Health Policy Manag. 
2019;8(4):191–194. doi:10.15171/ijhpm.2018.123
2. Mackey TK. Opening the policy window to mobilize action against 
corruption in the health sector: Comment on “We need to talk about 
corruption in health systems.” Int J Health Policy Manag. 2019; In 
Press. doi:10.15171/ijhpm.2019.65
3. Hussmann K. Addressing corruption in the health sector: Securing 
equitable access to health care for everyone. Bergen: U4 Anti-
Corruption Resource Centre; 2011.
4. Nye JS. Corruption and political development: A cost-benefit analysis. 
Am Polit Sci Rev. 1967;61(2):417-427. doi:10.2307/1953254 
5. Transparency International. Executive summary. In: Kotalik J, 
Rodriguez D, ed. Global Corruption Report 2006. London: Pluto 
Press; 2006:XVI-XXI. 
6. Kotalik J, Rodriguez D. Global Corruption Report 2006. London: 
Pluto Press; 2006.
7. Huss R, Green A, Sudarshan H, et al. Good governance and 
corruption in the health sector: lessons from the Karnataka 
experience. Health Policy Plan. 2011;26(6):471-484. doi:10.1093/
heapol/czq080
8. Lessig L. Foreword: “Institutional corruption” defined. J Law Med 
Ethics. 2013;41(3):553-555. doi:10.1111/jlme.12063 
9. Boisvert A-ML, Dent P, Quraishi OB. Definitions of Corruption. 
Research Brief NO. 48 2014; https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/CNT/
RSRCS/PBLCTNS/RGNZD-CRM-BRF-48/INDEX-EN.ASPX. 
Accessed July 15, 2019.
10. U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre. Glossary. https://www.u4.no/
TERMS#CORRUPTION. Accessed July 15, 2019.
11. Transparency International. 2015 Corruption Perception Index. 
https://www.transparency.org/CPI2015. Accessed May 28, 2019.
12. Measuring the health-related Sustainable Development Goals in 188 
countries: a baseline analysis from the Global Burden of Disease 
Study 2015. Lancet. 2016;388(10053):1813-1850. doi:10.1016/
s0140-6736(16)31467-2
13. Chêne M. Overview of corruption in Rwanda. Bergen: Transparency 
International and Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI); 2008.
14. Hin KT. Corruption control in Singapore. Tokyo: United Nations 
Asia and Far East Institute for the Prevention of Crimes and the 
Treatment of Offenders; No Date.
Huss
International Journal of Health Policy and Management, 2020, 9(1), 34–3838
15. Anonymous. Church claims sweeping opposition win. Africa 
Confidential. 2019;60(1). 
16. Trapido J. Ebola: public trust, intermediaries, and rumour in the DR 
Congo. Lancet Infect Dis. 2019;19(5):457-458. doi:10.1016/s1473-
3099(19)30044-1 
17. Anonymous. Obrigado e tchau, Dos Santos. Africa Confidential. 
2018;59(9). 
18. Persson A, Rothstein B, Teorell J. Why anticorruption reforms fail-
-systemic corruption as a collective action problem. Governance. 
2013;26(3):449-471. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0491.2012.01604.x 
19. Ostrom E. A behavioral approach to the rational choice 
theory of collective action. Am Polit Sci Rev. 1998;92(1):1-22. 
doi:10.2307/2585925 
20. Government Accountability Project. Paul Wolfowitz. https://www.
whistleblower.org/?S=PAUL%20WOLFOWITZ. Accessed July 4, 
2019. published 2019.
21. Transparency International. Anti-corruption glossary. 2018; https://
www.transparency.org/GLOSSARY. Accessed July 4, 2019.
22. Nadler J, Schulman M. Favoritism, Cronyism, and Nepotism. 
2019. https://www.scu.edu/government-ethics/resources/what-is-
government-ethics/favoritism-cronyism-and-nepotism/. Accessed 
July 4, 2019. Published 2019.
23. Abramson J. Nepotism and corruption: the handmaidens of 
Trump’s presidency. The Guardian. March 6, 2018. https://www.
theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/mar/06/nepotism-corruption-
handmaiden-trump-presidency. 
24. Chossière GP, Malina R, Ashok A, et al. Public health impacts 
of excess NO x emissions from Volkswagen diesel passenger 
vehicles in Germany. Environ Res Lett. 2017;12(3):034014. 
doi:10.1088/1748-9326/aa5987 
25. Guyton KZ, Loomis D, Grosse Y, et al. Carcinogenicity of 
tetrachlorvinphos, parathion, malathion, diazinon, and glyphosate. 
Lancet Oncol. 2015;16(5):490-491. doi:10.1016/s1470-
2045(15)70134-8
26. Gillam C. How Monsanto Plants Stories, Suppresses Science & 
Silences Dissent to Sell a Cancer-Linked Chemical. Democracy 
Now website. https://www.democracynow.org/2018/8/14/how_
monsanto_plants_stories_suppresses_science. Published August 
14, 2018.
27. Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC). Sections 7, 8 
And 9 Of The ICAC Act. 2019; https://www.icac.nsw.gov.au/about-
corruption/what-is-corrupt-conduct/sections-7-8-and-9-of-the-icac-
act. Accessed July 4, 2019. 
28. Fried M. Prescription for Poverty: Drug companies as tax dodgers, 
price gougers, and influence peddlers. Oxfam; 2018.
29. Tax Justice Network. Corporate Tax Haven Index (CTHI) 2019; 
Https://corporatetaxhavenindex.org/introduction/cthi-2019-results. 
Accessed July 7, 2019.
30. Gaitonde R, Oxman AD, Okebukola PO, Rada G. Interventions to 
reduce corruption in the health sector. Cochrane Database Syst 
Rev. 2016(8):CD008856. doi:10.1002/14651858.CD008856.pub2
31. Huss R. Humanism a better word than socialism. The Financial 
Gazette. August 31, 1990;4.
